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Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social
and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in
evolutionary games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics.
Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in
the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, we show that
this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In
particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an
aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the
different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and
degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final
outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the
system is then determined by the initial conditions.
Keywords: Complex networks, multiplex networks, evolutionary game theory, structured populations, emer-
gence of cooperation, scale-free networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic interactions between individuals are at the
root of society. It is highly beneficial to a population if
these interactions lead to large-scale cooperation [1, 2].
A widely used approach to promote cooperation relies
on economic incentives. Examples include performance
based bonuses in enterprises, reduced costs for the dis-
posal of sorted waste to encourage recycling, or sharing
the financial impact of climate change [3]. Large scale
cooperation can emerge through individual strategic in-
teractions that are commonly described by evolutionary
game theory [4–6], where incentives are incorporated into
payoffs that individuals earn from playing games with
their neighbors in a network of contacts [7–11]. The
impact of structured populations in a single domain on
the evolution of cooperation is well understood [12–16].
However, in reality, interactions take place in different
domains, such as business, circles of friends, family etc.
Such interactions can be captured by multiplex networks,
which are systems comprised of several network layers,
where the same set of individuals are present [17–21].
The impact of multiplexity on the outcome of evolution-
ary games is of high importance for the emergence and
stability of cooperation in real systems and has recently
attracted a lot of attention [22–34]. Especially the inter-
play between the structural organization of the different
domains in the multiplex—for example whether there are
correlations between the importance of an individual in
the business and social domain—and evolutionary game
dynamics is still not well understood.
In this paper, we show that the interplay between evo-
lutionary dynamics and the structural organization of the
multiplex can have dramatic consequences for the effec-
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tiveness of incentive schemes. In particular, if the degree
of nodes (which may abstract their importance) is corre-
lated among different domains, which is the case in most
real multiplexes [19–21, 35–37], the evolutionary dynam-
ics can become enslaved by the topology (topological en-
slavement). This means that the hubs may dominate
the game dynamics. In this case the ability of incen-
tives to control the system breaks down completely and
the outcome becomes independent of the payoffs. This
phenomenon can be interpreted as an encrusted society
which is insensitive to incentives.
II. RESULTS
Social and strategic interactions naturally occur in dif-
ferent domains, such as business, friends, family etc.
Each of the interaction domains is given by a network
of contacts. These networks are usually heterogeneous—
often scale-free—as well as highly clustered [38], i.e. they
have a large number of closed triangles [39]. The simul-
taneous presence of individuals in different domains is
naturally represented by a multiplex network [40]. A
multiplex is comprised of several network layers, each of
which consists of the same set of nodes. In real multi-
plexes, the topologies of the different layers are not in-
dependent from each other. Specifically, real multiplex
networks have been shown to be far from random super-
positions of their constituent layer topologies. Instead,
they exhibit a large number of overlapping edges [40],
the degrees of nodes between different layers are corre-
lated [19, 35, 36], and nodes tend to connect to similar
nodes in different layers [20] (similarity correlations).
Let us first focus on the effect of degree correlations.
We construct correlated and uncorrelated multiplexes us-
ing Barabasi-Albert (BA) networks in the individual lay-
ers. From these networks, we construct multiplexes ei-
ther by randomly matching individuals between the two
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2layers, in this case there are no degree correlations, or
by matching individuals according to their degree rank,
which leads to maximal degree correlations. We now sim-
ulate the evolutionary game dynamics. Individuals play
games with their contacts in each layer of the multiplex.
In each layer, individuals have two strategic choices: they
can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payoff of each
two-player game is then described by the payoff matrix
M =
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
. (1)
Parameters T and S define different games [4]. T < 1 and
S > 0 defines the “harmony” game, T < 1 and S < 0
corresponds to the “stag hunt” game, T > 1 and S < 0
yields the “prisoner’s dilemma”, and finally for T > 1
and S > 0 we obtain the “snowdrift” game. One round
of the game consists of each individual playing one game
with each of her neighbors in each layer in the multiplex.
Furthermore, we consider the evolution of the system to
be governed by imitation dynamics [41], reflecting that
individuals tend to adopt the strategy of more successful
neighbors. After each round of the game (synchronized
updates) each node i chooses first one layer, l, at random
and then—within this layer—one neighbor j at random,
and copies her strategy with probability Pl,i←j , speci-
fied by the Fermi-Dirac distribution [41] (in analogy to
maximum entropy considerations in Glauber dynamics)
Pl,i←j =
1
1 + e−(Πj−Πi)/K
. (2)
Herein,
Πi =
1
nl
nl∑
l=1
pii,l (3)
measures the aggregated payoff of node i given by the
sum of the payoffs pii,l of node i in layer l over all layers,
which we normalize by the number of layers. Parameter
K plays the role of a temperature and quantifies the irra-
tionality of the players. In the Supplementary Materials,
we show that different update rules yield qualitatively
similar results. After all nodes updated their strategy
simultaneously, we reset all payoffs. In this paper, if not
stated otherwise, we always start with 50% cooperators,
which are randomly assigned. Later, we will investigate
and discuss the impact of different initial fractions of co-
operators. As order parameter, we use the mean final
cooperation as
c =
1
nl
nl∑
l=1
cl , (4)
where cl denotes the final mean cooperation in layer l,
and nl is the number of layers.
The results show that a sufficiently large number of
layers and the existence of degree correlations give rise
BA 2 layers correlated BA 16 layers uncorrelated
BA 16 layers correlated GMM 16 layers correlated
a) b)
c) d)
Figure 1. Mean final cooperation (color coded) as a function
of the game payoff parameters T and S. Layers have always
N = 4000 nodes. Results are averaged over 400 realizations.
a) 2 layers BA multiplex with degree correlations. The case
for 2 layers without degree correlations in qualitatively similar
and shown in Supplementary Figure 3. b) 16 layers BA mul-
tiplex without degree correlations. c) 16 layers BA multiplex
with degree correlations. d) 16 layers GMM multiplex with
degree correlations (ν = 1), no similarity correlations (g = 0),
power-law exponent γ = 2.6, and mean local clustering coef-
ficient 0.4.
to a particularly interesting phenomenon. If the number
of layers is low we obtain a qualitatively similar behav-
ior as compared to the outcome in single networks, see
Fig. 1a. The results for a single network are shown in
the Supplementary Materials. In the absence of degree
correlations, increasing the number of layers only leads
to mild changes, cf. Fig. 1b. However, if degree correla-
tions are present and the number of layers is large enough,
in the whole T − S parameter space considered we now
observe a mean final cooperation of c ≈ 0.5, which is
nearly independent of the game payoff parameters T and
S (see Fig. 1c). We now consider more realistic multi-
plexes, for which we use the geometric multiplex model
(GMM) developed in [20]. This model has several ad-
vantages: we can tune the degree of heterogeneity of the
layer topologies (power-law exponent γ), we can generate
networks with realistic mean local clustering coefficients,
we can tune the strength of degree correlations between
the layers by varying parameter ν ∈ [0, 1] (0 means no
degree correlations, and 1 maximal correlations), and fi-
nally we can also tune similarity correlations that have
been found to exist in real multiplexes by varying param-
eter g ∈ [0, 1] (the combination of these correlations con-
trols the amount of overlapping edges, another important
property of real multiplexes). As shown in Fig. 1d, us-
ing these more realistic multiplexes yields similar results
as discussed before. Interestingly, the behavior does not
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Figure 2. A simple toy example of a three layer multiplex
with one hub and four leave nodes to illustrate topological en-
slavement. Red denotes defectors and blue cooperators. Pay-
offs that selected nodes have earned in the prisoner’s dilemma
(T = 1.5 and S = −0.5) in each layer are displayed on top of
the nodes. Dashed lines connect the same node in different
layers. a) Strong degree correlations are present, hence node
A is the hub in all three layers simultaneously. b) No degree
correlations. Node A is the hub in layer 1, but a leave node in
layers 2 and 3. Here we omitt the dashed lines for all nodes
except A and B for better readability.
change significantly as one varies the overlap (or param-
eter g respectively, see Supplementary Materials). These
findings suggest that degree correlations are responsible
for the observed phenomenon.
The mechanism at play is “topological enslavement”.
Individuals only have knowledge of the aggregated payoff
but imitate the strategy of other individuals in a partic-
ular interaction domain. This imitation process is blind
to where the actual payoff came from, which could have
been earned in another layer following a different strat-
egy. Hubs have the potential to earn higher payoffs be-
cause they play more games. Furthermore, due to their
high number of links, nodes are more likely to select
hubs as imitation candidates. If degrees are correlated
between the layers, hubs in one layer are also hubs in
another layer. Let us consider the harmony game with
S = 0.5, T = 0.5 as an example. Assume that we have a
hub that is initiated as cooperator in layer 1 and defector
in layer 2. Then, in the first round, in layer 1 the hub
earns an expected payoff of k/2 · 1.5 (recall that we as-
sign to each node the initial state of cooperate with 50%
probability). In layer 2 it earns k/2 · 0.5, which yields
an aggregated payoff of k/2 according to Eq. (3). For
the sake of simplicity, assume that we have, apart from
the hub, in each layer k other nodes that are exclusively
connected to the hub. These nodes then earn a payoff in
the range [0.5, 1.5]. Now, if k  1, the other nodes will
always imitate the hub, and not vice versa, and hence
a) b)
Figure 3. Mean final cooperation (color coded) for (a) the
harmony (T = 0.5 and S = 0.5) game and (b) the prisoner’s
dilemma (T = 1.5 and S = −0.5) as a function of the number
of layers nl and the strength of radial correlations ν. Networks
are generated with the geometric multiplex model described in
the text. Layers have N = 4000 nodes, power-law exponents
γ = 2.6, and mean local clustering coefficient 0.4. Results are
averaged over 400 realizations.
in layer 2 where the hub started as a defector eventually
defection will prevail, although this could not happen in
the harmony game in isolation. As we have seen in this
toy example, hubs can accumulate a high aggregated pay-
off, and if degree correlations are present, the topology
dominates the game dynamics. The consequence is that
the actual game payoffs T and S become irrelevant [42].
Instead, the outcome is determined by the initial condi-
tions. The behavior is similar in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. In Fig. 2a we present a toy example to illustrate
the mechanism for T = 1.5 and S = −0.5. Let us focus
on the green link in the figure connecting nodes A and B
in layer 1. In this layer, node A cooperates and earns a
payoff of 1 · 1 + 3 ·S = −0.5. Node B defects and earns a
payoff of 1 · T = 1.5. However, the aggregate payoffs as
defined in Eq. 3 are ΠA = 5.5/3 and ΠB = 0.5/3. Hence,
even if the defector B earns a higher payoff than A in
layer 1, the aggregate payoff of A is significantly higher
and B is likely to imitate the cooperating hub. This is
due to the multiplex topology, in particular the existence
of degree correlations (A is a hub in all layers). In other
words, especially in the early rounds of the game, the
high payoff a hub earns in layers where it defects makes
its strategy worth imitating even in layers where it co-
operates. This effect leads to topological enslavement,
where the initial state of the hub determines the out-
come of the entire layer (we show this with numerical
simulations in the following). Let us now consider the
case without degree correlations as illustrated in Fig. 2b.
Node A is still a hub in layer 1, but a leave node in the
two other layers. In the example presented in the figure,
the aggregated payoffs of nodes A and B are ΠA = −1/3
and ΠB = 1/3 respectively. Hence, it is likely that node
A, the hub, switches to defection and subsequently de-
fection will spread across the system. In this case, the
hub is not able to drive the entire layer to cooperation,
and topological enslavement is not observed.
Topological enslavement emerges and triggers payoff
4g=0 g=1a) b)
Figure 4. Mean final cooperation (color coded) in the public
goods game as a function of the number of layers nl and the
strength of degree correlations ν. Networks are generated
with the geometric multiplex model. Layers have N = 4000
nodes, power-law exponents γ = 2.5, mean local clustering
coefficient 0.4. The synergy factor is r = 1.6. Results are
averaged over 400 realizations a) No similarity correlations
(g = 0). b) With similarity correlations (g = 1).
irrelevance as we increase the number of layers and the
strength of degree correlations. In a single domain, defec-
tion is the prevailing strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma
and cooperation flourishes in the harmony game. This
also applies to the topologies considered here, see Sup-
plementary Materials. In the following we choose these
games because they are prototypes of very different sit-
uations, where the outcome in a single domain is either
cooperation or defection. However, even in these com-
plementary cases, we find that if the number of layers is
large enough and degrees correlations are strong enough,
topological enslavement makes the final outcome of these
two games indistinguishable. This is shown in Fig. 3. If
degree correlations are weak (small ν) and/or the number
of layers is small (low nl), we recover the known result
from a single domain, namely cooperation in the harmony
game and defection in the prisoner’s dilemma. However,
if degree correlations are strong enough and the number
of layers is large enough, both games show the same out-
come: a mean cooperation of c ≈ 0.5 (see green area in
Fig. 3).
Finally, topological enslavement is not restricted to
pairwise games like the prisoner’s dilemma or the har-
mony game. Let us consider the public goods game as an
example, where individuals play in different overlapping
groups. A node with degree k participates in k+1 groups
centered around each of its neighbors and itself [43]. Co-
operators contribute to the common pool with a total
amount that they divide equally among the groups they
participate in. The total amount in the common pool
of each group is multiplied by a factor r and distributed
equally among all members of the group. The game is
played independently in different layers, and the total
payoffs are aggregated for each node (see Supplementary
Materials for details). The results are shown in Fig. 4.
For the given synergy factor, cooperation density is large
in the absence of degree correlations, (> 70%), but if
a) b)
c)
Figure 5. Mean final cooperation (color coded) averaged over
400 realizations for (a) the harmony (T = 0.5 and S = 0.5)
and (b) the prisoner’s dilemma (T = 1.5 and S = −0.5) game
as a function of the inital density of cooperators c0 and the
strength of radial correlations ν. Multiplexes are generated
with the geometric multiplex model and have 16 layers and
are generated with the model described in the text. Layers
have N = 4000 nodes, power-law exponents γ = 2.6, and
mean local clustering coefficient 0.4. (c) Histograms of the
cooperation density cl in different layers l. We show results for
the uncorrelated as well as the correlated case for the harmony
game and prisoner’s dilemma as indicated in the plot titles.
the number of layers is large and degree correlations are
present, cooperation density drops to a value close to 50%
(independently of parameter g and hence of the overlap
in the multiplex. The behavior is insensitive to a change
of parameter g, and hence of the overlap in the multiplex,
in contrast to recent findings in lattice topologies [26]. In
other words, the effect of heterogeneity and degree cor-
relations is the dominant factor). These findings suggest
that topological enslavement can occur in a broad range
of games.
Moreover, topological enslavement implies that the ini-
tial conditions play an important role for the final out-
come. If we start for example with 30% cooperators, the
hubs will also be initially cooperative with 30% probabil-
ity and, following the aforementioned mechanism, on av-
erage 30% of the layers will become cooperative, whereas
the remaining 70% will become defective. Indeed, we
observe that initial conditions determine the outcome if
degree correlations are strong. We show this in Fig. 5,
where we vary the initial cooperation c0 from 10% to
90%. For weak degree correlations, in the harmony game
we observe mainly cooperation, and in the prisoner’s
dilemma mainly defection. However, as the strength of
degree correlations increase, the final outcome aligns very
well with the initial density of cooperators, approxima-
tively independently of the game that is played.
Finally, the numerical results confirm that topological
5enslavement separates the layers into two groups with ei-
ther near full cooperation or defection respectively. This
behavior is shown in Fig. 5c, where we have set c0 = 0.5.
In the absence of degree correlations (ν = 0), in the har-
mony game we find that cooperation is high in all layers,
whereas in the prisoner’s dilemma defection prevails for
the parameters T and S considered here. However, if de-
gree correlations are strong (ν = 1), we observe that in
both games layers are either highly cooperative or nearly
fully defective. The probability of a random chosen layer
to be highly cooperative is then approximatively equal
to c0, and hence in this case 50%. In the Supplementary
Materials we show this behavior for different values of c0
and ν.
III. DISCUSSION
To conclude, humans constantly interact in different
domains where they can adopt different strategies in evo-
lutionary games. A player who interacts with an oppo-
nent in one domain may not have knowledge of the op-
ponent’s behavior in the other domains. Therefore, the
success of the opponent in terms of her aggregated pay-
off can be the result of interactions in other domains,
where she may have played a different strategy. Because
these interactions are “hidden” from the player, she will
attribute the success of the opponent to her strategy in
the domain where the two interact. We have shown that
the degree of cooperation cannot be modulated by the
payoff parameters of the game if the system meets cer-
tain topological conditions, which are found in most real
multilayer systems. This means that payoff-based incen-
tive schemes can become ineffective in environments with
multiple domains of interaction.
In particular, the different domains can be represented
as a multiplex network. In these type of systems, indi-
viduals are simultaneously present in different network
layers with different topologies. In reality, the topologies
of different layers are often related, commonly featuring
a large edge overlap, degree correlations, and correlations
between the similarity of nodes. We have shown that if
degree correlations between different heterogeneous lay-
ers are strong enough and individuals engage in many
domains, incentives that represent the payoff in strate-
gical games can fail. In this case, the final outcome is
strongly determined by the initial conditions. This phe-
nomenon, which we call topological enslavement, occurs
because nodes that are hubs in different layers can accu-
mulate a high aggregated payoff such that other nodes
will tend to imitate their strategies in a specific domain,
regardless of whether their payoff was earned in this do-
main. Hence, if individuals interact in multiple domains
in a way that imitates more successful behavior, the pay-
off of strategical games can become irrelevant for the final
outcome.
The resulting situation can be interpreted as an en-
crusted society, which is insensitive to payoff-based in-
centives. Mixing the influence individuals have in differ-
ent domains destroys the correlations between the layers
and hence is an effective measure to avoid this situation,
but might not be practical in reality. Therefore, it consti-
tutes an important task for future research to investigate
whether the transition from such payoff-based incentives,
where one incentivizes “how to act”, to topological incen-
tives, which promote “with whom to act”, could provide
a cure for an encrusted society. Finally, it would be in-
teresting to conduct experiments with human subjects to
verify our theoretical results.
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